

CNCI-SCRM

US Comprehensive National
Cybersecurity Initiative –
Supply Chain Risk Management

**“UNDERSTANDING
the CHALLENGES from
OUTSOURCING”**

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
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Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI)

Focus Area 1



Establish a front line of defense

Focus Area 2



Demonstrate resolve to secure U.S. cyberspace & set conditions for long-term success


Focus Area 3



Shape the future environment to demonstrate resolve to secure U.S. technological advantage and address new attack and defend vectors



Globalization brings challenges to DoD...




◆ The government has suppliers that it may not know and may never see

- ▶ Less insight into suppliers' security practices
- ▶ Less control over business practices
- ▶ Increased vulnerability to adversaries

"Scope of Supplier Expansion and Foreign Involvement" graphic in DACS
www.softwaretchnews.com Secure Software Engineering, July 2005 article "Software Development Security: A Risk Management Perspective" synopsis of May 2004 GAO-04-678 report "Defense Acquisition: Knowledge of Software Suppliers Needed to Manage Risks"



Globalization brings challenges to DoD...





Today's Reality of our Increased Dependency Requires an Increased Confidence in our ICT

- Dependencies on technology are greater then ever

-- Possibility of disruption is greater than ever because hardware/software is vulnerable

--- Loss of confidence alone can lead to stakeholder actions that disrupt critical business activities



Internet users in the world: 1,766,727,004
E-mail messages sent today: 215, 674, 475, 422
Blog Posts Today: 458, 972
Google searches Today: 2,302,204,936



Who is behind data breaches?

74% resulted from external sources (+1%).
20% were caused by insiders (+2%).
32% implicated business partners (-7%).
39% involved multiple parties (+9%).

How do breaches occur?

7% were aided by significant errors (<>).
64% resulted from hacking (+5%).
38% utilized malware (+7%).
22% involved privilege misuse (+7%).
9% occurred via physical attacks (+7%).

* Source – 2009 Verizon Data Breach Investigations Report





ASD(NII) / DoD CIO

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DASD(IIA) / DoD-CISO

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**TMSN
Mitch Komaroff**

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**Jenine Alston
Policy+**

**Annette Mirsky
Pilots+**

**Joe Wassel
Criticality+**

**Don Davidson
Standards+**


**Pat Sullivan
CFIUS**




Product Assurance *TRADESPACE*



Unique Requirements



Higher COST can buy Risk Reduction



SCRM Standardization and Levels of Assurance will enable **Acquirers** to better communicate requirements to **Systems Integrators & Suppliers**, so that the “supply chain” can demonstrate good/best practices and enable better overall risk measurement and management.

Slippery Slope / Unmeasurable Reqts


Lower Cost usually means Higher RISK

Risk



SCRM Stakeholders


US has vital interest in the global supply chain.



SCRM Standardization Requires Public-Private Collaborative Effort



ISO 27036: Information technology – Security techniques –Information Security for Supplier Relationships




ISO 27036 Part 3 on "Supplier Relationships"

- **ICT SCRM ISO Standard**
- **Development 2010-2013**
- **Adoption 2013-2016**



SCRM Landscape of activities

US has vital interest in the global supply chain.



SCRM “commercially acceptable global standard(s)” must be derived from Commercial Industry Best Practices.

SCRM Standardization Requires Public-Private Collaborative Effort




Collecting Data: “Understanding the Challenges”

- ◆ Assessing Cyber Supply Chain Security Vulnerability within the US Critical Infrastructure--- Jon Oltsik (ESF)
- ◆ IT Supply Chain Research on Industry Perspectives--- Sandy Boysen (UMD)
- ◆ Software Supply Chain Risk Management from Products to Systems of Systems--- Carol Woody (SEI)
- ◆ Critical Code Model for Supply Chain issues--- Bill Scherlis (CMU)



CYBERSECURITY






"Govt. Activities w/ SCRM & SwA Equities"

- ◆ CNCI-SCRM Section 254 Report --- Don Davidson (DoD)
Countering Counterfeits Tiger Team (C2T2)
- ◆ Sub-IPC on CyberSecurity Standardization--- Don Davidson (DoD)
- ◆ White House Office of Science & Technology Policy (OSTP)
call for input on S&T standardization---Ajit Jillavenkatesa (NIST)
- ◆ White House Office of Intellectual Property Enforcement
Coordinator (IPEC)---Mike Powers (NASA)
- ◆ DoD Office Diminishing Manufacturing Sources and Material Shortages
(DMSMS) ---Alex Melnikov (DoD)



SCRM & C2T2 in the DoD Lifecycle



254 Report Identified a Need for a Plan-of-Action on

COUNTERING COUNTERFEITS


especially during

OPERATIONS & SUSTAINMENT

“CNCI-SCRM is multi-pronged approach for global supply chain risk management. ...Managing this risk will require a greater awareness of the threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences associated with acquisition decisions; the development and employment of tools and resources to technically and operationally mitigate risk across the lifecycle of products (from design through retirement); the development of new acquisition policies and practices that reflect the complex global marketplace; **and partnership with industry to develop and adopt supply chain and risk management standards and best practices.**”



Countering Counterfeits Strategic Concept





C2T2 Process-to-Product

Work with new WH directed IPR.gov Task Force!

C2T2 Task
 "...Address DoD's vulnerabilities associated with counterfeits in our supply chains and methods to mitigate risks caused by those counterfeits."

Developing a DoD "Countering Counterfeits" **holistic strategy** to reduce & manage risks from counterfeits in the supply chain

- C2T2 Strategy**
- ✓ Investigated Situation,
 - ✓ Drafted Mission, Vision, Goals, "Definition"
 - ✓ Identified "Countering Counterfeits" Activities,
 - ✓ Conducted Preliminary Gap Analysis, to better enable DoD to prevent, detect, and respond to counterfeits
 - ✓ Drafted DTM & POAM



- C2T2 Way Ahead**
- Appoint OPR**
- Finalize DTM & POAM**
- Policy
 - Processes (with Metrics)
 - Resources
- ... to implement Strategy**

Dec	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec
22 Dec'09 C2T2 Memorandum		Data Collection & Meetings		Tri-Chair Updates		Site Visits / Analysis & Meetings		AT&L / NI Strategy UPDATE		Way Ahead C2T2 → OPR		Dec'10 OPR, DTM & POAM



Some Key ICT Applications	Cloud Computing	First Responders	Industrial Control Systems	Health IT	Smart Grid	Telecommuting	Voting
Core Areas of Cyber Security Standardization							
Cryptographic Techniques							
Cyber Incident Management							
ICT System Security Evaluation							
Identity Management							
Information Security Management Systems							
Network Security							
Privacy							
Software Assurance							
Supply Chain	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed	New Standards Needed
System Security Engineering							



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